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ABSTRACT
This is the introduction to and summary of Phase III of an international research project to study the
relationship between social security provisions and retirement. The project relies on the work of a
large group of economists in 12 countries who conduct the analysis for each of their countries. The
first phase described the retirement incentives inherent in plan provisions and documented the strong
relationship across countries between social security incentives to retire and the proportion of older
persons out of the labor force. The second phase illustrated the large effects that changing plan
provisions would have on the labor force participation of older workers. This third phase shows the
consequent fiscal implications that extending labor force participation would have on net program
costs – reduced government social security benefit payments less increased government tax revenues.
The findings are conveyed by simulating the implications of illustrative reforms. One reform
increases benefit eligibility ages by three years. Another illustrative reform reduces actuarially
benefits received before the normal retirement age. A common reform prescribes the same provisions
in each country. The financial implications of the illustrative reforms are very large in many
instances, often as much as 20 to 40 percent of current program costs. The savings amount to as
much a 1 percent or more of country GDP. The results make clear that reforms like those considered
in this volume can have very large fiscal implications for the cost of social security benefits as well
as for government revenues engendered by changes in the labor force participation of older workers.
Jonathan Gruber










dwise@nber.org Page  1 
Social Security Programs and Retirement around the World:  
Fiscal Implications 
 
Introduction and Summary 
by 
Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wise 
  Under pay-as-you-go social security systems most developed countries have 
made promises they can’t keep. The systems in their current forms are not financially 
sustainable.  What caused the problem?  It has been common to assume that the 
problem was caused by aging populations. The number of older persons has increased 
very rapidly relative to the number of younger persons and this trend will continue. (See 
Figure 1.
1) Thus the proportion of retirees has increased relative to the number of 
employed persons who must pay for the benefits of those who are retired. In addition, 
persons are living longer so that those who reach retirement age are receiving benefits 
longer than they used to.  The effect of aging populations and increasing longevity has 
been compounded by another trend: older persons are leaving the labor force at 
younger and younger ages, further increasing the ratio of retirees to employed persons.  
(See Figures 2a and 2b.)  What has not been widely appreciated is that the provisions 
of social security programs themselves often provide strong incentives to leave the 
labor force.  By penalizing work, social security systems magnify the increased financial 
burden caused by aging populations and thus contribute to their own insolvency. 
  Several years ago we began an international project to study the relationship 
between social security program provisions and retirement.  This volume presents the 
results of the third phase of the project.  The first phase described the retirement 
                                                 
1 In this figure “Now” varies from country to country but is generally the early 1990s.  Page  2 
incentives inherent in plan provisions and documented the strong relationship across 
countries between social security incentives to retire and the proportion of older persons 
out of the labor force (Gruber and Wise 1999a).  The second phase illustrated the large 
effects that changing plan provisions would have on the labor force participation of older 
workers.  This third phase shows the consequent fiscal implications that extending labor 
force participation would have on net program costs—reduced government social 
security benefit payments less increased government tax revenues.   
  The findings are conveyed by simulating the implications of illustrative reforms.  
One reform increases benefit eligibility ages by three years.  Another illustrative reform 
reduces actuarially benefits received before the normal retirement age.  A common 
reform prescribes the same provisions in each country.  The financial implications of the 
illustrative reforms are very large in many instances, often as much as 20 to 40 percent 
of current program costs.  The savings amount to as much a 1 percent or more of 
country GDP. 
  The results of the ongoing project are the product of analyses conducted for each 
country by analysts in that country.  Researchers who have participated in the project 
are listed below.  The authors of the country papers in this volume are listed first; others 
who participated in one of the first two phases are listed second and shown in italics 
  Belgium    Raphaël Desmet, Alain Jousten, Sergio Perelman, Pierre 
Pestieau, Arnaud Dellis, and Jean-Philippe Stijns 
 Canada   Michael  Baker,  Jonathan Gruber, and Kevin Milligan    
 Denmark   Paul  Bingley,  Nabanita  Datta Gupta, and Peder J. Pedersen 
 France  Emmanuelle  Walraet,  Ronan  Mahieu,  Didier Blanchet, and      
    Louis-Paul Pelé 
  Germany    Axel Börsch-Supan, Simone Kohnz, Giovanni Mastrobuoni, 
and Reinhold Schnabel  
 Italy    Agar  Brugiavini  and  Franco  Peracchi     
  Japan     Akiko Sato Oishi, Takashi Oshio, and Naohiro Yashiro  
  Netherlands    Arie Kapteyn and Klaas de Vos          
  Spain     Michele Boldrin, Sergi Jiménez-Martín, and Franco Peracchi    Page  3 
  Sweden    Mårten Palme and Ingemar Svensson        
  United Kingdom  Richard Blundell, Carl Emmerson, Paul Johnson, Costas 
Meghir, and Sarah Smith   
 United  States Courtney  Coile, Jonathan Gruber, and Peter Diamond 
  
  An important goal of the project has been to present results that were as 
comparable as possible across projects.  Thus the papers for each phase were 
prepared according to a detailed template that we prepared in consultation with country 
participants.  In many cases the country papers contain analyses in addition to those 
prescribed in the template, usually pertaining to reforms or reform proposals in 
individual countries.   
  Before discussing in more detail the results of this phase of the project we 
summarize the results of the previous two phases.  We give particular attention to the 
second phase, which provides the empirical base for the analysis in this volume. 
PHASE I 
  The goal of the first stage of the project was to describe the incentives inherent in 
the social security provisions and to relate the incentives to the labor force participation 
of older workers across nations.  The core of each Phase I paper is a detailed analysis 
of the retirement incentives inherent in the provisions of that country’s retirement 
income system  based on a template that described in detail how the incentives were to 
be calculated.  By making the same analytic calculations and by presenting the same 
simulations in each of the countries, the individual studies could provide a means of 
comparing the retirement incentives among the countries.  Each of the country papers 
presents completely parallel labor force and other data for men and women.  To simplify 
the exposition here, only data for men are discussed, but the effect of the social security  Page  4 
incentives to leave the labor force, as discussed below, appear to be at least as 
important for women as for men.   
Unused Labor Force Capacity 
  The proportion of men out of the labor force between ages 55 and 65 in 11 coun-
tries is shown in Figure 3.  The term “unused labor force capacity” is used to emphasize 
that incentives to induce older persons to leave the labor force reduces national econo-
mic production, recognizing of course that not all persons in these age ranges want to 
work or are able to work.  For the 55 to 65 age group the proportion ranges from close 
to 0.7 in Belgium to about 0.2 in Japan.  Subsequent results will show the relationship 
between social security plan provisions to leave the labor force and this measure of 
unused labor force capacity.  We first describe the measurement of incentives to retire. 
Measuring Incentives to Retire 
  Three key features of social security systems have an important effect on labor 
force participation incentives.  The first is the age at which benefits are first available.  
This is called the early retirement age, or the age of first eligibility.  Across the countries 
participating in this study, the first eligibility age ranges from about 53 for some 
employee groups in Italy to 62 in the United States.  In none of the countries in this 
project does a significant portion of persons retire before the first eligibility age.  The 
“normal” retirement age—e.g. 65 in the United States—is also important, but typically 
much less important than the early retirement age. Now in most countries, few people 
work until the “normal” retirement age.  
  The second important feature of plan provisions, which is strongly related to the 
extent to which people continue to work after the early retirement age—and which we 
emphasized in this phase of the analysis—is the pattern of benefit accrual after the age  Page  5 
of first eligibility.  The idea can be explained this way:  Consider two components of total 
compensation for working an additional year.  One component is current wage earnings.  
The other component is the “increase” in future promised social security benefits.  Con-
sider a person who has attained the social security early retirement age (when benefits 
are first available) and suppose that a person is considering whether to work for an 
additional year.  It is natural to suppose that if benefit receipt is delayed by a year, bene-
fits when they are received might he increased, to offset the receipt of benefits for one 
fewer years.  But in most countries this is not the case.  Once benefits are available, a 
person who continues work for an additional year will receive less in social security 
benefits over his lifetime than if he quit work and started to receive benefits at the first 
opportunity.  That is, the present value of expected social security benefits declines.  In 
many countries, this loss of social security benefits can offset a large fraction of the 
wage earnings a person would receive from continued work.  Thus there is an implicit 
tax on work and total compensation can be much less than net wage earnings. 
  A bit more formally, consider the difference between the expected discounted 
value of social security benefits (social security wealth) if retirement is age a+1 and the 
present value if retirement is at age a—SSW(a+1) – SSW(a).  This difference is called 
the accrual of benefits between age a and age a+1.  It is this value that is often neg-
ative.  If the accrual is positive it adds to total compensation from working the additional 
year; if the accrual is negative, it reduces total compensation.  The ratio of the accrual to 
net wage earnings is an implicit tax on earnings if the accrual is negative and an implicit 
subsidy to earnings if the accrual is positive.  Thus a negative accrual discourages 
continuation in the labor force and a positive accrual encourages continued labor force 
participation.  This accrual rate, and the associated tax rate, is one of the key calcula- Page  6 
tions that was made in the same way for each of the countries.  As it turns out, the 
pension accrual is typically negative at older ages: continuation in the labor force means 
a loss in the present discounted value of pension benefits, which imposes an implicit tax 
on work and provides an incentive to leave the labor force.  In many countries the 
implicit tax on work is 80 percent or more the first year after benefit eligibility. 
  This feature of plan provisions is related to a technical term called “actuarial 
adjustment.”  In the United States, for example, if benefits are taken at 64 instead of 65, 
they are reduced just enough to offset the receipt of benefits for one additional year.  If 
they are taken at 63 instead of 65 they are reduced just enough to offset the receipt of 
benefits of 2 additional years, and so forth.
2   Under some plan provisions there is no 
actuarial adjustment.  The importance of this feature is discussed in some detail below.  
  A third important feature of social security systems is that in many European 
countries disability insurance and special unemployment programs essentially provide 
early retirement benefits before the official social security early retirement age.  Figure 4 
shows the proportion of men collecting disability benefit by age in seven of the coun-
tries.
3  At age 45, the proportion of men collecting disability benefits is rather close in all 
of the countries; the range is from 2 to 5 percent in all of the countries except the 
Netherlands where the rate is 8 percent.  At age 64, however, the range is from about 7 
percent in Spain and the United States to over 37 percent in Sweden.
4  In each of the 
countries with very high proportions, the rate essentially falls to zero at the “normal” 
retirement age, which is 65 in Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands, and Germany, and 60 
                                                 
2 Under current law, benefits in the Unites States are actuarially fair between 62 and 65, but are increased less than 
actuarially if the receipt of benefits is delayed beyond age 65, thus providing an incentive to leave the labor force at 
65.  Benefits will eventually become actuarially fair after age 65 as well. 
3 To reduce the complexity of the figure, data are shown only for selected countries. 
4 The data for Italy are similar to the data for Spain.  The rates for Belgium and Canada are similar and follow a path 
approximately midway between the path for the United States and the path for Germany.  Page  7 
in France.  At the normal retirement age, benefits are obtained from country social 
security programs rather than disability programs.  It is evident that the receipt of 
benefits from a disability program does not always indicate that a person is physically 
disabled.  
   Figure 5 shows the pathways to retirement in Germany from 1960 to 1995. It is 
clear that the proportion of persons retiring at the age-65 normal retirement age 
declined substantially over this period, while the proportion retiring under disability and 
unemployment programs and under the social security age-63 “early” retirement pro-
gram increased correspondingly.  In Germany, many employees retire as early as age 
57 under a “disability” program.  In 1995, 65 percent of men retired under a disability or 
special unemployment program.  Where these programs are important they are 
incorporated in the social security incentive calculations.   
Retirement Incentives and Labor Force Participation  
  To summarize the social security incentive to retire in each country we proposed 
a simple measure.  At each age, beginning with the early retirement age, the implicit tax 
on work was calculated in each country.  These implicit tax rates on work were then 
summed, beginning with the early retirement age and running through age 69. This 
measure we called the “tax force” to retire.  The sum is shown for each of the countries 
in Figure 6. This tax force to retire ranges from over 9 in Italy to about 1.5 in the United 
States. 
The Tax Force to Retire and Unused Labor Force Capacity 
  The key finding from Phase I of the project is shown in Figures 7 and 8.  Figure 7 
shows the relationship between the tax force to retire and unused labor force capacity—
the proportion of men between ages 55 and 65 that is out of the labor force.  It is clear  Page  8 
that there is a very strong correspondence between the two.  Figure 8 shows the same 
data for all of the countries except Japan, and rescales the tax force measure to 
achieve a linear relationship between the tax force to retire and unused labor force 
capacity.  The relationship between the two is perhaps even more evident. The propor-
tion of variation in unused labor force capacity that is explained by the tax force to retire 
is 86 percent (as indicated by the R-squared value). 
  The results of the first phase were reported in Gruber and Wise (1999a).  The 
introduction (Gruber and Wise 1999b) concluded this way: 
  The populations in all industrialized countries are aging rapidly and 
individual life expectancies are increasing.  Yet older workers are leaving the 
labor force at younger and younger ages.  In several countries in our study, 
participation rates for men 60 to 64 have fallen from over 70% in the early 1960s 
to less than 20% now.  This decline in labor force participation magnifies 
population trends, further increasing the number of retirees relative to the number 
of persons who are working.  Together these trends have put enormous pressure 
on the financial solvency of social security systems around the world.  Ironically, 
we argue, the provisions of the social security systems themselves typically 
contribute to the labor force withdrawal. 
 
  It is clear that there is a strong correspondence between the age at which 
benefits are available and departure from the labor force. Social security 
programs often provide generous retirement benefits at young ages. In addition, 
the provisions of these programs often imply large financial penalties on labor 
earnings beyond the social security early retirement age.  Furthermore, in many 
countries disability and unemployment programs effectively provide early 
retirement benefits before the official social security early retirement age.  We 
conclude that social security program provisions have indeed contributed to the 
decline in the labor force participation of older persons, substantially reducing the 
potential productive capacity of the labor force.  It seems evident that if the trend 
to early retirement is to be reversed, as will almost surely be dictated by 
demographic trends, changing the provisions of social security programs that 
induce early retirement will play a key role. 
 
PHASE II 
  The first stage of the project established two key results: (1) that the social 
security systems in many countries provide enormous incentives to leave the labor force 
at older ages; and (2) that there is a strong correspondence between social security  Page  9 
incentives to retire and the withdrawal of older workers from the labor force. The 
relationships in the first volume, however, did not provide a means of estimating the 
magnitude of the effect on labor force participation of changes in plan provisions.   
  The goal of the second phase of the project was estimate how much the 
retirement age would change if social security provisions were changed. This analysis 
was based on within-country analysis of the determinants of retirement, considering the 
relationship between retirement and the incentives faced by individual employees.  That 
is, rather than considering system-wide incentives for representative persons (such as 
those with median earning histories), and comparing these incentives to aggregate 
labor force participation across countries, we turned to micro-econometric analyses 
within countries.  The results of these analyses are based on differences in individual 
circumstances within a given country.  Persons in a given country who are similar in 
many respects face quite different retirement incentives.  It is these differences in 
retirement incentives—among otherwise similar persons—and the corresponding 
differences in individual retirement decisions that are used to determine the effect of the 
incentives on retirement.  
  In Phase II, the investigators in each country put together large micro-data files 
which combined information on individual retirement decisions with retirement incen-
tives (together with other individual data).  Individual measures of social security 
retirement incentives—which vary substantially across persons within a country—were 
calculated based on the methods developed for the first phase of the project.  A key 
incentive measure was the “option value” of delayed retirement.  This forward-looking 
measure is based on the potential gain (or loss) in wage earnings plus social security 
wealth if receipt of benefits is delayed.  The financial value of retiring at the current age  Page  10 
is compared with the age at which the financial value is the greatest, which could be the 
current age or could be many years in the future.  That is, this constructed economic 
variable describes the financial gain or loss from continuing to work.  Estimation using 
this measure goes back to the procedure Stock and Wise (1990a, 1990b) used to 
analyze the effect on retirement of employer-provided defined benefit pension plans in 
the United States.  Estimates were also obtained based on the related peak value 
measure proposed by Coile and Gruber (2001), which is based on the potential gain (or 
loss) in social security wealth only if receipt of benefits is delayed Although the focus of 
the analysis is on forward-looking measures of the incentive to retirement—or for 
continued work—a natural starting point is a measure that looks ahead only one year, 
the single year accrual measure.  This measure captures the effect of another year of 
work on future benefits.  Thus, as a base for comparison the country analyses present 
the single-year accrual incentive measure as well. 
  As in the first phase, the analysis in each country followed a detailed template, so 
that results could be compared across countries. The micro-analysis in each country is 
based on a sample of individuals.  In some cases, the data come largely from adminis-
trative records, while in other cases, the data were obtained from special surveys.  The 
coverage is not precisely the same in each country.  Nonetheless, it was possible to 
estimate the same models in each country, even though the population covered by the 
country data sets differed in some respects.    
  The key advantage of the micro-estimation is that in each country the effects of 
changes in plan provisions could be predicted.  A second key feature of the micro 
analyses is that they allow consideration of several features of social security systems—
as well as individual attributes—that may simultaneously affect retirement decisions.  In  Page  11 
particular, the micro-estimation results made it possible to estimate jointly the effect on 
retirement of the age at which benefits are first available and the incentive to retire once 
benefits are available.  Both of these features were shown in the first stage of the 
project to be important determinants of retirement. 
  The analysis in Phase II, however, posed several estimation challenges.  Per-
haps the most difficult was to identify the effect on retirement of the first eligibility age—
in particular to distinguish the effect of the eligibility age from the effect of the incentive 
measure, given eligibility.  This was an important consideration because a key empirical 
regularity across all countries was that retirement before the first eligibility age is rare 
and there is typically a jump in retirement at successive eligibility ages, in particular the 
age of first eligibility.  This empirical regularity is discussed in some detail in the intro-
duction to the Phase II volume (Gruber and Wise 2004b).  To address this and other 
identification issues, each country estimated two different specifications of the base 
retirement model with respect to age: a model including a linear age trend and a model 
including age-specific dummy variables. 
Parameter Estimates 
  The results in Volume II produced a striking finding: in virtually every country, in 
virtually every specification, the retirement incentives inherent in most social security 
programs are strongly related to departure from the labor force.  In ten of the twelve 
countries we studied, the incentive measure effects were uniformly negatively related to 
retirement (a higher option value or peak value of continued work led to less retirement) 
and significantly different from zero.  The results were robust to the use of both linear 
age and age dummy variables.  In two of the countries, Italy and Spain, the peak value  Page  12 
and option value effects were typically not significant and sometimes of the wrong sign.
5   
In these two countries the single year accrual effect is negative and significantly related 
to retirement in four of the six cases.   
  Thus, overall, we found the results from these 12 separate analyses to be 
strikingly consistent.  The incentives inherent in retirement income programs are clear 
determinants of individual retirement behavior.  The estimates themselves strongly 
suggest a causal interpretation of the cross-country results presented in our first 
volume.  The results point to an important relationship between incentive effects and 
labor force participation, independent of cultural difference among countries.  The 
magnitudes of the implied effects are also very comparable across countries, as shown 
by the simulations discussed below. 
Simulations 
  To demonstrate the effect of plan provisions on retirement, the estimates for 
each country were used to simulate the effect of three illustrative changes in plan 
provisions.  Two illustrative plan changes were simulated in Phase II of the project, and 
a third was added in  Phase III.  All three are described here: 
(1)  Three-year increment in eligibility ages:  This illustrative simulation 
increases all eligibility ages by three years, including the early retirement age, the 
normal retirement age, and the ages of receipt of disability benefits—in countries 
in which disability, unemployment, or other retirement pathways are important, 
the eligibility age for each of the programs is delayed by three years. 
(2)  Actuarially fair:  This reform reduces benefits actuarially if taken before the 
normal retirement age and increases benefits actuarially if taken after the normal 
retirement age. 
 
(3)  Common reform:  This illustrative simulation is intended to predict the effect 
of the same reform (the “common reform”) in each country.  Under the common 
                                                 
5 In the United Kingdom the option value incentive measures are significant when a “bootstrap” method that 
accounts for repeated observations for the same person is used to calculate standard errors.  Also in the United 
Kingdom, both the peak value and the option value incentive measures are very significant–under conventional 
standard error estimates--when cohort indicator, instead of age indicator, variables are used.  Page  13 
reform, the early retirement age is set at age 60 and the normal retirement age at 
65.  Benefits taken before age 65 are reduced “actuarially,” by 6 percent for each 
year before age 65.  Benefits taken after age 65 are increased by 6 percent for 
each year the receipt of benefits is delayed.  In addition, the replacement rate at 
age 65 is set at 60 percent of (projected) age 60 earnings. 
 
It is clear that an increase in eligibility ages will typically increase labor force 
participation in each country.  The implications of the actuarial and common reforms are 
less obvious, so we illustrate their likely effects across different countries using the 
examples of Germany and the United States. 
  In Germany there was no actuarial adjustment before the 1992 reform legislation, 
and until recently most employees still retired under provisions that did not include 
actuarial adjustment.  The magnitude of the combined effect of early retirement under 
the disability program in Germany and no actuarial adjustment is illustrated conceptually 
in Figure 9.  The official social security normal retirement age in Germany is 65.  
Suppose that at that age, benefits would be 100 units per year.  Many employees can 
receive benefits at age 57 through the disability program.  The disability benefits at 57 
are essentially the same as normal retirement benefits at age 65.  That is, a person 
“eligible” for disability benefits at age 57 who did not take the benefits at that age would 
forego 100 units per year.  This results in a baseline profile of benefits that starts at age 
57 and remains flat at 100 units per year. 
  On the other hand, suppose benefits were reduced actuarially if taken before age 
65 and increased actuarially if taken after age 65.  Then benefits taken at 57 would be 
about 60 instead of 100.  Benefits if taken at 70 would be about 140 instead of 100.  
There would be no incentive to take benefits early.  Indeed there would be no social 
security incentive to take benefits at any specific age, once benefits were available.  Page  14 
  Figure 10 shows a comparable figure for the United States.  In both countries the 
normal retirement age is 65.  Benefits in the United States are first available at 62, 
however, compared to the common receipt of benefits from a disability program at age 
57 in Germany.  In addition, benefits taken before age 65 in the United States are 
reduced actuarially.  Benefits at 62 are 80 percent of benefits at 65.  The increase in 
benefits after age 65 is less than actuarially fair, however.
6  Thus a reform to adjust 
benefits actuarially in the U.S. would have no effect before age 65, and only a small 
effect thereafter.  It should be clear from Figures 9 and 10 that increasing the first 
eligibility age—without any actuarial adjustment—would increase labor force participa-
tion in both countries, although the size of the effect is likely to be greater in Germany 
than in the United States because benefits at the first eligibility age are much larger in 
Germany than in the United States.  Under this illustrative reform, in Germany benefits 
would be zero at age 57, 58, and 59.  Benefits would first be available at age 60.  In the 
United States, this illustrative reform would increase the age of first eligibility from 62 to 
65.   
  Continuing to use a conceptual representation of social security provisions in 
Germany as an example, Figure 11 shows the effect of the common reform in Germany, 
and, for comparison, shows the actuarial reform as well.  The common reform 
incorporates actuarial reduction in benefits before and actuarial increase in benefits 
after the normal retirement age, as described in Figure 9 above.  In addition, the com-
mon reform in Germany implies a substantial reduction in benefits at the age 65 normal 
retirement age.  And, the common reform in Germany would increase the age of first 
eligibility by 3 years (and thus incorporates the three-year increment in eligibility). In 
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short, the receipt of benefits is delayed from 57 to 60, benefits at the normal retirement 
age are reduced from 100 to 75, and normal retirement age benefits are adjusted 
actuarially if taken before or after the normal retirement age.   
  The diagram suggests that the combined effect of these changes is likely to be 
large in Germany.  Benefits before age 57 are no longer available.  When they are 
available at 60 there is no financial incentive to take benefits then as opposed to some 
later age, and when the normal retirement age is reached there is no financial incentive 
to take benefits at that age as opposed to some later age.  (The results below show that 
the actuarial reduction accounts for a large fraction of the labor force participation effect 
of the common reform in Germany.) 
  Figure 12 is a conceptual representation of the common reform in the United 
States. The common reform provides benefits two years earlier than the current early 
retirement age of 62. In addition, the common reform represents approximately a 33 
percent increase in benefits at the normal retirement age. These two features of the 
common reform should be expected to reduce the labor force participation of older 
workers in the United States.  (In addition, the common reform provides for an actuarial-
ly fair increase in benefits after age 65, which would provide some incentive to remain in 
the labor force for persons who were still employed at ages older than 65.)   
  The cases of Germany and the United States are representative of the other 
nations in our sample.  Most European nations have a system similar to Germany’s, so 
that we would expect for them very large increases in labor force participation from all 
reforms.  Canada is more similar to the United States, so that raising eligibility ages will 
raise labor force participation, the common reform will lower participation, and the 
actuarial reform will have little effect.   Page  16 
  In general, specific features of the current plan in each country suggest how the 
common reform should change labor force participation in that country.  Thus in part, 
the common reform is used to confirm that the simulation results, when compared 
across countries, conform to expectations based on current plan provisions. 
Results 
  As emphasized above, we made calculations based on two principle estimation 
specifications (option value, OV, and peak value, PV) and three simulation methods. 
The three simulation methods are: 
•  S1: Use the retirement model with linear age 
 
•  S2: Use the retirement model with age dummies, and assume that the age 
dummies effects purely represent taste for leisure and do not change when the 
system is reformed 
 
•  S3: Use the retirement model with age dummies, and assume that the deviation 
of age dummies from a linear age trend purely represent effects of the retirement 
system 
 
Arguments can be made for all three of these approaches.  The advantage of the first 
approach is that it allows us to remain neutral on the meaning of age-specific retirement 
patterns, but at the risk of mis-specifying the regression model.  But once age dummies 
are included, we do not know exactly whether they should be interpreted as variations in 
taste for leisure by age or as program effects.  Thus, in this section, we will rely on the 
results from simulation approach S1, as a middle ground; the actual chapters in 
Volumes II and III show the results from all simulation methods. 
  Three-Year Increment in Eligibility Ages and Labor Force Participation:  The 
basic findings can be shown in two figures.  Figure 13 shows the effect of the three-year 
increment in eligibility ages, based on the method that we believe is most likely to reflect 
the long-run effect of such a reform.  To help to standardize for the wide variation  Page  17 
across countries in the age at which retirement begins, each bar shows the reduction in 
the fraction of the population out of the labor force four years after the age at which a 
quarter of the population has retired (which is an “effective retirement age”). There are 
two notable features of this figure.  The first is that the average reduction in the OLF 
proportion is very large—47 percent.  The second is the similarity across countries.  The 
reduction is between 34 and 55 percent in 9 of the 12 countries.  In Germany and Swe-
den, the reductions are 77 and 68 percent respectively.  (The average reduction is 28 
percent using the simulation method that we believe is likely on average to substantially 
underestimate the response to the three-year increment.)   
  The Common Reform and Labor Force Participation:  Figure 14 shows the 
effect on the OLF proportion of the common reform.  In this figure, it is clear that the 
greatest reductions in the OLF proportion under the common reform are realized in the 
countries with the youngest effective retirement ages.  For the six countries with sub-
stantial retirement before age 60, the average reduction in the OLF proportion is 44 
percent.  For the six countries in which most retirement is after age is 60, there is a 4 
percent average increase in the OLF proportion.   
  The systematic pattern of these results shows a strong correspondence with 
intuition.  For the six countries with youngest effective retirement ages, the common 
reform represents a substantial increase in the youngest eligibility age, and the actuarial 
reduction in most of these countries means that benefits at this age are much lower 
than under the base country plans.  Thus, for these countries, the OLF proportion 
should decline under the reform, and that is the case for every country but Canada.  But 
for the six countries with older retirement ages, the common reform may reduce the 
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leave the labor force.  In addition, the 60 percent replacement rate at the normal 
retirement age represents an increase for countries, such as the United States, but a 
reduction in the replacement rate for other countries.  Consequently, in three of these 
six countries, there is an increase in the OLF proportion under the common reform 
simulation, and on average there is an increase in the OLF proportion.  (The seemingly 
anomalous result for Canada is explained by the fact that Canada is the only country in 
which the 25% age is below the nominal social security entitlement age; the 25% age is 
58 while the social security entitlement age is 60.  In addition, Canada has relatively low 
benefits at the age 60 early retirement age.  Thus the common reform significantly 
increases benefit levels, providing an additional inducement to retirement.)  
  A key reason for simulating the common reform was to determine whether the 
results would correspond with intuition based on current plan provisions.  That the 
correspondence is close we believe helps to add credence to the estimation and 
simulation methods and to the overall results. 
  We concluded the introduction to this phase of the project (Gruber and Wise 
2004b)—with these comments: 
  The results of the country analyses reported in this volume confirm the 
strong causal affect of social security program retirement incentives on labor 
force participation.  But perhaps more important, the results in this volume show 
the large magnitude of these effects.  Across 12 countries with very different 
social security programs and labor market institutions, the results consistently 
show that program incentives accord strongly with retirement decisions.  The 
magnitude of the estimated effects varies from country to country, but in all 
countries the effects are large. 
  In short:  the results in this volume provide an important complement to 
the first volume.  The results leave no doubt that social security incentives have a 
strong effect on retirement decisions.  And the estimates show that the effect is 
similar in countries with very different cultural histories, labor market institutions, 
and other social characteristics.  While countries may differ in many respects, the 
employees in all countries react similarly to social security retirement incentives.  
The simulated effects of illustrative reforms reported in the country papers make  Page  19 
clear that changes in the provisions of social security programs would have very 
large effects on the labor force participation of older employees. 
 
PHASE III 
  Using the estimates from Phase II, Phase III of the project describes the fiscal 
implications of changes in program provisions. What would be the financial implications 
of changing the provisions of social security systems?  Again, the results are demon-
strated by simulating the fiscal effects of illustrative reforms.  In this phase, all three 
illustrative reforms described above are simulated.  In addition to the three-year 
increment and the common reforms, we also simulate separately an “actuarially fair” 
reform.  As noted above, in the United States and in Canada, for example, benefits 
taken before the early retirement age are reduced actuarially (so that, on average, 
benefits received over a lifetime do not depend on the age at which receipt of benefits 
begins), so that this simulation closely parallels existing law.  In many European 
countries, however, there is little or no actuarial reduction if benefits are taken early. 
This provides a very large incentive to leave the labor force early, so that moving to an 
actuarially fair system can have very large fiscal implications in many countries. 
  The goal of the analysis in this phase is not to calculate the long-run balance 
sheets of a social security system, as is undertaken for example by the United States 
Social Security Administration (SSA).  Rather the approach taken here is to illustrate the 
fiscal implications by calculating the implications of reform for a specific cohort or for a 
group of cohorts.  For example, in the United States, the estimates show the fiscal 
implications of changes in social security provisions for the cohort born between 1931 
and 1941 (reaching age 65 between 1996 and 2006).  The calculations in Phase III, like  Page  20 
those in Phases I and II, are made according to a detailed template so that the results 
can be compared across countries. 
  In each country, the simulations proceed in several steps: 
1)  Using the retirement models estimated in Phase II of the project, predict the 
distribution of retirement ages under current law (the “base” case). 
 
2)  For this distribution of retirement ages, compute the fiscal position of the cohort—
total expected benefits paid to the cohort and total expected taxes (both social 
security and other taxes) paid by the cohort. 
 
3)  Use the retirement models to predict the distribution of retirement ages under a 
reform. 
 
4)  For the new distribution of retirement ages, compute the fiscal position of the 
cohort. 
 
5)  Calculate the difference between fiscal positions under the base and the reform 
systems to obtain the fiscal implication of reform. 
 
6)  Divide the fiscal implication into two components: The mechanical effect is the 
effect of the reform assuming no behavioral response (change in retirement 
ages) to the reform.  The behavioral effect is the additional incremental effect due 
to retirement response to the reform.   
   To illustrate the method used in each of the country papers, we describe key 
calculations for two countries—the effects of the reforms in Canada, focusing on the 
three-year increment in eligibility ages, and effects of the actuarial reform in Germany.  
These examples also help to highlight how the details of the current plan provisions, 
including the treatment of different components of the current system, influence the 
effect on the illustrative reform.  We then show comparative results across countries.  
Canada—Three-Year Increment in Eligibility Ages  
  We illustrate the results presented in each paper using results for Canada as an 
example.  (Values are shown in Euros, converted from Canadian dollars at the 
December 31, 2001 exchange rate—C$1.4185 = €1.00.)  The Canadian retirement 
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1)  The Old Age Security (OAS) pension is a lump sum that is paid to all citizens 65 
and older.  (It was $442.66 in March 2002(€312.06) at the December 31, 2001 
exchange rate.)  The OAS is indexed to the CPI and is fully taxable.  (It also 
includes a “claw-back” provision for very high-income recipients.)   
2)  The Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) is an income-tested supplement for 
low-income OAS beneficiaries.  (In January to March 2002 it was $526.08 for 
married couples and $342.67 for single persons (€370.85 and €241.57) 
respectively.) The GIS is indexed to the CPI and is not subject to income taxes.  
These benefits are not adjusted actuarially.   
3)  The largest component of the social security system (called the Income Security 
system in Canada) is the combination of the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) and 
the Quebec Pension Plan (QPP).  The actuarial reduction applies only to the 
CPP/QPP component, for which the normal retirement age is 65 and the early 
retirement age is 60.  The reduction rate is 0.5 percent per month (6 percent per 
year), so that those retiring at 60 receive 70 percent of the age 65 benefit.  The 
CPP/QPP replaces at most 25 percent of pre-retirement income.   
For this discussion, we focus on the three-year increment in eligibility but show key data 
for the other reforms as well.  The main results are shown in two tables in each of the 
country papers.  The example for Canada shows how these tables are organized and 
how to interpret the entries.  
  Table 1 shows the total effect of each of the three reforms.  As noted above, 
reforms were simulated for each country using six methods—three simulation 
approaches, each implemented based on the option value and the peak value incentive 
measures.  Here we show the results for the option value model and for simulation 
method S1.  Each of the country papers presents a table with six panels—one for each 
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Table 1.  Canada illustration: total fiscal effect of reform: OV- S1 
Present Discounted Value  Total Change Relative to 
Base  Cost or 
Revenue 












Benefits 111,084  91,491  111,084 187,796 -17.60% 0.00% 69.10% 
Taxes: 
Payroll  15,182 16,821 15,182 12,537 10.80% 0.00% -17.40%
Taxes: 
Income  81,313 85,075 81,313 93,608  4.60% 0.00% 15.10% 
Taxes: 
Consumption  37.54 37,265  37,540  41,314 -0.70% 0.00% 10.10% 
Taxes:  Total  134,034 139,161 134,034 147,459 3.80% 0.00% 10.00% 
 
  The first four columns show the present discounted value (PDV) of benefits and 
taxes under the base plan and under each of the three illustrative reforms.  For 
example, the PDV of future benefits payments under the base plan is 111,084 Euros.  
Under the three-year increment the PDV is reduced to 91,491 Euros.  Total taxes under 
the base plan are 134,034 Euros, and are comprised of payroll taxes (15,182), income 
taxes (81,313) and consumption taxes (37,540).
7  Total taxes increase slightly to 
139,161 Euros under the three-year increment.   
  The last three columns show the total change relative to the base.  For example, 
the three-year increment reduces benefits by 17.6 percent and increases tax receipts by 
3.8 percent.  The change in benefits minus the change in taxes (-19.593 - 5,127 = -
24,720 Euros) is 22.3 percent of the base benefit costs (111,084 Euros) of the program.   
This percent is shown explicitly in Table 2 below and is the key result of the simulation.  
                                                 
7 Consumption tax revenues are imputed based on the income associated with each policy.  Payroll tax revenues 
include the share of general revenues that are associated with Social Security programs, as imputed in each country.  Page  23 
  The actuarial reform has no effect in Canada because, as mentioned above, 
benefits are adjusted actuarially under the base (current) plan so the actuarial reform is 
not a change.  The common reform increases program costs substantially in Canada, 
primarily because benefits under the common reform are much larger than current 
benefits in Canada. 
  Table 2 below shows the total effect of the reform, shown in Table 1,   
decomposed into mechanical and behavioral components.  Again each of the country 
papers presents a second key table with six panels and each of the panels is organized 
like Table 2 shown here.  The mechanical component is the effect of the reform 
assuming no behavioral—labor force participation—response to the reform.  The 
behavioral component is the additional incremental effect resulting from the labor force 
supply response to the reform.  For example, the three-year increment mechanical 
effect reduces benefits by 19,452 Euros. The behavioral response—a substantial 
increase in the typical retirement age—in fact reduces benefits a bit more.  (This 
apparent anomaly is the result of specific features of the Canadian social security 
system and is explained below.)  The mechanical effect reduces total taxes by 4,753 
Euros (and is also explained below).  The behavioral effect—prolonging participation in 
the labor force—leads to an increase in taxes of 9,905 Euros.  The total effect on taxes 
is an increase of 5,127 Euros.  The net change in benefits minus tax revenues is -
24,720 Euros, which is equivalent to 22.3% of the base (current) cost of the program.  
This change as a percent of base benefits is perhaps the single best summary of the 
effect of the illustrative reform.  Comparable percents apply to each of the reforms in 
each of the countries and are used below to provide cross-country comparisons. 
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Table 2.  Canada illustration: decomposition of total effect of reform, change in 
present discounted value:  OV-S1 






ioral  Total  Mech-
anical
Behav-
ioral  Total  Mech-
anical 
Behav-
ioral  Total 
Benefits  -19459  -134  -19593 0 0 0  79151  -2438  76713 
Total 
Taxes 
-4778  9905  5127  0 0 0  36231  -22806  13425 
Net 
Change 
-14681  -10039  -24720 0 0 0  42920  20368  63287 
Change 
as a % 
of Base 
Benefits 
-13.20% -9.00% -22.30% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 38.60% 18.30% 57.00%
  
  A series of figures help to explain the results in Tables 1 and 2, focusing on the 
three-year increment.  Figure 15 shows the present discounted value of social security 
wealth by age of retirement, under the base plan and under the three-year increment.  
Benefits taken at any age are lower under the three-year increment. There are two 
reasons for the pattern across ages.  First, the age-65 normal retirement age under the 
base plan is increased to 68 under the three-year increment.  Thus benefits taken at 55, 
for example, are lower under the three-year increment because they are discounted 
actuarially from 68 to 55 instead of from 65 to 55.  Second, while the CPP and QPP are 
actuarially adjusted, so that receiving them later does not affect their PDV, the GIS and 
OAS are not.  So if the age of receipt of these programs is delayed, that lowers the PDV 
of benefits at all ages.  
  Figure 16 shows the relationship between total taxes and retirement age. Taxes 
increase sharply with age, but at any age of exit from the labor force, taxes are less 
under the three-year increment.  This is because the OAS component of the social 
security benefit—which is taxable—is received for three fewer years under the three- Page  25 
year increment.  Thus prolonging labor force participation yields increased tax revenues 
from taxes on the increased wage earnings.  But this increase is partially offset by the 
reduction in future taxable social security benefits under the three-year increment. 
  Figure 17 shows the distribution of retirement ages under the base and under the 
three-year increment reform.  The upward shift in the distribution is clear.  The 
behavioral component of benefits and taxes reported in Table 2 is due to this upward 
shift in retirement ages. 
  Figure 18 shows how the total effect reported in Table 2 arises by considering 
the change in expected totals by age.  The bars labeled “total benefits” show the 
change in expected benefits by age.  For example, the expected payment to persons at 
age 55 is lower because fewer persons retire at this age and because they receive 
lower payments, as shown in Figure 15 above.  The expected payment of benefits to 
persons age 64 or older, however, is increased under the three-year increment.  Even 
though the benefit per person is lower under the three-year increment, more people 
retire at these ages, leading to an increase in the expected payment to these older 
persons.  Aggregated over all ages—weighted by the proportion of persons retiring at 
each age—the reduction is 19,593 Euros, shown under benefits total in Table 2.   
  The lighter bars show the change in the expected benefit payments by age, less 
the expected tax revenues of persons who retire at each age.  Expected benefits minus 
tax revenues are lower at each age under the three-year increment.  The reduction in 
the expected value of benefits minus taxes is less than the reduction in benefits at 
younger ages because persons who retire at these ages pay lower taxes on future 
social security benefits than they used to, as explained with reference to Figure 15 
above.  Nonetheless there is a net gain to the government budget. The important  Page  26 
feature shown by this figure is that even at older ages—at which the expected benefits 
are increased under the three-year increment because more persons are retiring at 
these ages—the added taxes paid by these persons when they are working more than 
offsets the greater expected benefits paid to persons at these ages.  The net reduction 
in benefits minus taxes across all retirement ages is 24,720 Euros, as shown in Table 2 
above.
8 
  Finally, Figure 19 shows the fiscal effect of the three-year increment as a percent 
of GDP.  This figure shows the estimated effect for each of the six methods used to 
obtain estimates.  The reduction in government benefits payments minus revenues 
ranges from about .30 to .45 percent of GDP, depending on the estimation method. 
 Figures  like those for Canada are shown in each of the country papers, but the 
figures that the country authors have selected to show vary from country to country.  
Tables showing results like those in Tables 1 and 2, however, are shown for each 
country. 
Germany—Actuarial Adjustment 
  Germany has a very generous social security system, with very strong incentives 
to retire early.  In addition to the social security program per se, a large fraction of 
workers in Germany retire through disability and unemployment programs, as described 
above.  These programs essentially provide early retirement benefits before the age 60 
social security early retirement age.  Indeed, these programs provide the principle path 
to retirement in Germany.  And as described above, once benefits are available, there is 
                                                 
8 The sum over the values in the figure is not exactly 24,720.  Figure 18 shows the average benefits and taxes at each 
age (Figure 16) times the average retirement rates at each age (Figure 17).  The 24,720 in Table 2 comes from taking 
each individual in the sample and multiplying benefits and taxes by probabilities of retirement, and then taking the 
average.  The bars in Figure 18 sum to 24,193. 
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no actuarial reduction in benefits taken before the age-65 “normal” retirement age 
(although recent reforms have introduced some actuarial reduction).  For example early 
retirement benefits taken at age 60, or benefits from the disability program taken at age 
57, are the same as the age-65 normal retirement benefits.  This provides an enormous 
incentive to take benefits when they are first available.  If they are not taken, they are 
simply lost; there is no offsetting increase in benefits if they are received for fewer 
years. 
  Suppose that benefits in Germany were “actuarially fair,” so that benefits 
received prior to age 65 were reduced by 6 percent per year, and benefits received after 
65 were increased 6 percent per year.    What would be the fiscal implication of such a 
change?  Table 3 shows the effect of this change on the mean retirement age for the 
sample of workers used in the analysis.  The mean retirement age for men under the 
current provisions is 61.91. The base simulation yields a mean retirement age very 
close to the sample mean.  The actuarially fair reduction in benefits is estimated to 
increase the retirement age by about 3 years, for both men and women.  Figure 20 
shows the change in the distribution of retirement ages for men; there is a clear shift to 
older ages throughout the distribution. 
  
  The fiscal implications of this change are shown in Table 4.  As described above, 
the total effect of the reform is decomposed into two parts—the  mechanical effect that 
would exist if retirement ages did not change, and the behavioral effect that is due to 
Table 3.  German Illustration:  Effect of Actuarial Reduction in Benefits on 
Retirement Age: OV Model 
Model Men  Women 
Sample frequencies  61.91  61.73 
Base simulation  62.05  62.01 
Actuarially fair simulation  65.18  64.57  Page  28 
change in retirement ages.  Benefits received at any age less than 65 are reduced by 
the actuarial reduction.  If there were no change in retirement ages, the average benefit 
per worker would be reduced by 37,056 Euros.  But the behavioral response to the 
reform increases the average retirement age, as shown in Table 3 and Figure 20.  This 
increases the average benefit by 19,632 Euros. The total (net) effect on benefits is a 
reduction of 17,423 Euros.   
  In addition to the change in benefits, the reform has further fiscal implications.  
Contributions to the social security system are increased if employees continue to work.  
This behavioral effect is +16,766 Euros.   
  In addition, if employees work longer, they pay more in other taxes.  The total 
increase in taxes is 49,049 Euros per worker (including taxes for health and other 
insurance programs, income taxes, and VAT tax).  The net change in benefits minus the 
change in contributions and taxes is -83,238 Euros.  This net reduction in the total 
government benefit payments minus revenues is equivalent to 42.85 percent of base 
benefits under the current system.  The fiscal effect of the reform as a percent of GDP is 
shown in Figure 21, which shows the estimated effect for each of six estimation and 
simulation methods.  On balance, the reduction in benefits minus all taxes is about 1.2 
percent of GDP. 
Table 4. German Illustration:  Fiscal Implications of Actuarial Fair Reform:  
Change in PDV,  Euros per Worker (OV model, dummies shifted) 
    
  Mechanical Effect  Behavioral Effect  Total Effect 
      
Benefits -37056  19632  -17423 
Contribution 0  16766  16766 
All taxes  -1558  50608  49049 
Net change  -35497  -47741  -83238 
% Change  -18.27%  -24.58%  -42.85%  Page  29 
Cross-Country Comparisons 
  Calculations like those illustrated for Canada and Germany were made by each 
of the country teams for each of the three illustrative reforms.  As the illustrations high-
light, the effect of each of the reforms depends on the provisions of the current system 
in each country.  An increase in eligibility ages is expected to reduce expenditures and 
increase tax revenues in all countries.  But even in this case, the added tax revenue 
from increased labor force participation can be at least partly offset by lower taxes 
resulting from lower future social security benefits as in Canada.  The actuarial reform, 
which has large effects in Germany, should have little effect in countries like the United 
States and Canada where the system is already actuarially fair.   
  Results across all countries are shown in the next five figures.  Like the results 
for the first two phases of the project, these results are taken from the individual country 
papers.  For these comparisons, we use the estimates based on the option value 
specification and simulation method “S3”—sometimes referred to as OV-S3 or as option 
value-age dummies shifted.  The figures show the total fiscal effect of the reforms.  To 
reduce complexity, the figures do not divide the total effect into the mechanical and the 
behavioral components that can be seen in the country papers.  The behavior effects of 
the three-year increment in eligibility ages and of the common reform on labor force 
participation are shown in Figures 13 and 14 respectively. 
  Figure 22 shows the total fiscal effect of the three-year increment in eligibility 
ages.  For example, in Germany, the reduction in government benefit payments minus 
the increase in tax revenues—resulting from a three-year increment in all eligibility 
ages—would be equivalent to about 36 percent of the current cost of the program.  
Across all countries, the average decrease in government benefit payments minus tax  Page  30 
revenues is equivalent to 27 percent of current program cost.  The anomalous positive 
total fiscal effect in Denmark is due to the replacement of 3 years of Old Age Pension 
benefits with benefits from a more generous early retirement program. 
  Figure 23 shows the decrease in government benefit payments minus tax 
revenues—resulting from the three-year increment—as a percent of Gross Domestic 
Product.  The average decrease over all countries is equivalent to 0.97 percent of GDP 
and is greater than 0.50 percent or greater in all but two of the countries—again 
reported as a reduction in government benefit payments minus tax revenues. 
  Figure 24 shows the fiscal effect of the actuarial adjustment, as a percent of base 
cost.  As expected, there is large variation across countries.  As noted above, In the 
United States and Canada where adjustment is close to actuarial already, the effect is 
small.  In Germany, where until recently there was no actuarial adjustment, the effect is 
very large, as explained in detail above. 
         In France, the actuarial increase in benefits after the age-60 early retirement age 
would prolong participation in the labor force and would increase benefits for many 
retirees.  The early retirement age in France is 60 and the normal retirement age 
depends on the number of "validated" participation quarters.  (The normal retirement 
age is the minimum of 65 and the age at which a person attains 150 validated 
quarters).  But under the current system there is no actuarial adjustment of benefits if 
they are taken after the age of first eligibility and the reduction in benefits if they are 
taken before the normal retirement is greater than actuarial.  For persons with more 
than 150 validated quarters, the actuarial upward adjustment of benefits after age 60 
would increase their pension benefits.  The reduction in benefits if they are taken with  Page  31 
less than 150 quarters is less under the actuarial reform.  So both the behavioral and 
the mechanical effects of the actuarial reform increase the cost of benefits.  
  On average across all countries the decrease in government expenditure minus 
revenue is equivalent to about 26 percent of the base cost—reported as a reduction in 
government benefit payments minus tax revenues.  Because of particular features of 
the current system in the United Kingdom, the actuarial reform has not been simulated 
for that country. 
  Figure 25 shows the fiscal effect of the common reform, as a percent of base 
cost.  In accord with intuition, the total net government revenue as a percent of program 
base cost varies greatly.  In the United States for example, benefits under the common 
reform are more generous than current benefits and they are available at age 60 
instead of the current age-62 early retirement age.  Also in the United Kingdom, the 
common reform benefits are much more generous than current benefits and the age-60 
early retirement age is younger than the current early retirement age for some 
participants. 
  Figure 26 shows the fiscal effects of each of the reforms on the same figure, 
ordered by the effect of the common reform.  This figure helps to emphasize the 
sometimes intricate relationship between current plan provisions and the effects of the 
illustrative reforms.  In the United States and Canada, for example, the three-year 
increment reduces (net) program costs.  The actuarial reform has essentially no effect in 
Canada where the system is already actuarial, and little effect in the United States 
where the system is close to actuarial.  But in both of these countries the common 
reform provides higher benefits than provided by the current systems, and in the United  Page  32 
States benefits are available 2 years earlier than the current early retirement age.  Thus 
the common reform substantially increases program costs in these countries. 
  As another example: In France, the three-year increment would reduce net 
program costs.  The actuarial adjustment alone would increase benefit payments as 
described above.  But the common reform provides much lower benefits than the 
current system in France.  In addition the common reform sets the normal retirement 
age at 65 and benefits are reduced actuarially between 65 and the age 60 early 
retirement age.  Thus, on balance, the common reform implies a substantial reduction in 
net program cost in France. 
  Although not detailed in this introduction, the results for each of the countries are 
determined by the precise relationships between the current plan provisions and the 
illustrative reform. 
CONCLUSIONS: LOOKING BACK AND GOING FORWARD 
  Our introduction to Phase I of the project emphasized the striking relationship 
across countries between social security program incentives to retire and the proportion 
of older persons out of the labor force (Figures 7 and 8 above).  The weight of the 
evidence, we judged, was that the relationship was largely causal.   
  The results of the country analyses reported in Phase II of the project— based on 
within-country analysis of micro data—confirmed the strong causal effect of social 
security program retirement incentives on labor force participation and showed the large 
magnitude of these effects.  The results left no doubt that social security incentives have 
a strong effect on retirement decisions. Across 12 countries the results consistently 
showed that program incentives accord strongly with retirement decisions.  The 
magnitude of the estimated effects varies from country to country, but in all countries  Page  33 
the effects were found to be large.  And the estimates show that the effect is similar in 
countries with very different cultural histories, labor market institutions, and other social 
characteristics.  While countries may different in many respects, the employees in all 
countries react similarly to social security retirement incentives.  The simulated effects 
of illustrative reforms reported in the country papers made clear that changes in the 
provisions of social security programs would have very large effects on the labor force 
participation of older employees. 
  In this phase of the project we built on the estimates obtained in the second 
phase to analyze the fiscal implications of program provisions.  In particular, we 
estimated the financial implications of three illustrative program reforms.  The results 
make clear that reforms like those considered in this volume can have very large fiscal 
implications for the cost of social security benefits as well as for government revenues 
engendered by changes in the labor force participation of older workers.   
  On average across the 12 countries, we judge that a three-year increase in 
program eligibility ages would reduce government benefits payments minus tax 
revenues by 27 percent of current program cost.  The average reduction is 
approximately 0.72 percent of country GDP.  While the estimates vary by method of 
estimation—as reported in each of the country papers—we believe that these averages 
reflect the most likely long-run effect of the illustrative reforms.  Actuarial reform alone 
would have a very large effect in some countries—reducing net government cost by 
over 40 percent in 5 countries—depending on the extent of actuarial adjustment to 
benefits under the current program provisions. 
  In the second phase of the project, we used estimates of the of the labor force 
participation effects of the common reform to judge the plausibility of the estimates.  In  Page  34 
this third phase we estimated the fiscal implication of the common reform.  Again we 
find that the results accord strongly with intuition based on the provisions of the current 
plans. In accord with intuition, the common reform yields both increases and reductions 
in government revenue equivalent to a large fraction of current program costs.  We 
believe that this adds credence to the methods used for estimation of the fiscal effects 
of the illustrative reforms. 
  In short, the fiscal effects of reform can be very large.  Some combination of 
increases in the early retirement age, actuarial adjustment of benefits, and change in 
the benefit level can change net government revenue substantially.  In many countries, 
the illustrative reforms simulated by the participants in this project yield reductions in 
government benefit payments minus tax revenues equivalent to 20 to 50 percent of 
current program cost.   
  Finally, having emphasized the potential for changes in plan provisions to 
increase the labor force participation of older workers and to relieve the financial 
pressure on social security systems, we consider how such changes in social security 
systems may already be having an effect in some countries.  Figures 27a and 27b are 
the same as Figures 2a and 2b but they have been updated to include labor force 
participation rates of men from about 1995 to about 2003.  In many of the countries 
there seems to be a clear reversal in the decline in labor force participation.  In some 
countries the reversal can be traced to changes in social security provisions, while in 
others it seems to be associated with economy-wide trends in labor market conditions.   
  Consider Denmark first.  Except for updating the series, the only other change is 
the addition of data for Denmark, which was added to the project after the first phase.  
In 1999, the Post Employment Wage (PEW) program was changed to provide  Page  35 
incentives to stay in the labor force until 62.  (When the PEW program was introduced in 
1979 it induced an almost immediate drop of 17 percentage points in the labor force 
participation rate of men 60 to 64.) 
  In Sweden, the explanation for the increase in the labor force participation of men 
60 to 64 lies primarily in changes in the eligibility requirement for the disability program.  
The provision that unemployed workers older than aged 60 were eligible for a disability 
pension was abolished in 1991 and the provision that these unemployed workers were 
eligible because of a combination of medical and labor market reasons was abolished in 
1997.  The most important change was likely the 1995 provision that enabled the social 
security administration to reconsider the right to a disability pension.  Consistent with 
these changes, from 1993 to 2002 the percent of men aged 60 to 64 with a disability 
pension was reduced from 30 to 23 percent.  In addition, the Swedish economy has 
recovered from the 1990s recession during the 1990s that limited labor force demand.   
  In Germany, the reversal of the downward trend in the labor force participation of 
men 60 to 64 that began in 1997 coincides with the introduction of partial actuarial 
reduction in benefits taken before the early retirement age.  In the United States the 
downward trend was reversed about 1995.  While the reason for the reversal is unclear, 
it seems likely that the decline in employer-provided defined benefit pension plans—with 
strong incentives to retire early—and the rapid spread of personal retirement plans—
with no retirement incentive effects—has been part of the explanation.   
  In the United Kingdom, there has been a general increase in labor force 
participation rates at all ages, but there was no apparent change in social security plan 
provisions that might have lead to an increase for men 60 to 64.  In Canada, there were 
no changes in social security provisions that could account for the increase in the labor  Page  36 
force participation of men 60 to 64.  There was, however, a general improvement in 
labor market conditions after the mid 90s, with a fall in the overall unemployment rate 
from 10.4 percent in 1995 to 7.6 percent in 2003.  In Spain, the reforms during the 1997 
to 2002 period did not change substantially the retirement incentives faced by older 
workers.  There was, however, a large increase in the labor force— from about 12.5 
million in 1995 to over 17 million in 2004—apparently due to an increase in the demand 
for labor.  And during this period, labor force participation increased from 50.8 to 55.7 
percent. 
  We do not yet have a succinct explanation for the increase in the labor force 
participation in the Netherlands.  Early retirement provisions in the Netherlands are the 
result of collective bargaining by sector, or even by firm, and hence it is hard to easily 
identify and summarize changes in plan provisions.     
  Thus far in the project, we have considered the early retirement incentives 
inherent in many social security programs, the reduction in the labor force participation 
of older workers induced by these penalties on work, and the consequent financial 
implications of the induced early retirement.  Going forward, we will direct our attention 
to several new issues, including: the relationship between social security system 
provisions and the well-being of the elderly and the young, the relationship between 
social security system provisions and the employment of the young, and how the 
relationship between health status and retirement varies with social security (including 
disability) program provisions. 
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Figure 3.  Unused productive capacity:
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Figure 4.  Proportion of men collecting 




















Figure 5.  Germany: Pathways to retirement for 
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Figure 6.  Sum of Tax Rates on Work
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Figure 11.  Germany:  base, 3-year increment, 
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Figure 13. OLF Change 25% Age + 4 Yrs






















  Page  45 
Figure 14. OLF Change 25% Age + 4 Yrs
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Figure 17.  Canada: Distribution of labor force exit 
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Figure 18.  Canada:  Total effect of three-year 
























Figure 19.  Canada: Fiscal implication of three-
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Figure 20. Germany:  Distribution of retirement ages 
























Figure 21. Germany: Fiscal implications of actuarial 
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Figure 22. Total fiscal effect of
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Figure 24.  Total fiscal effect of























Figure 25.  Total fiscal effect of
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Figure 26. Total fiscal effect of 3-year 
increment, actuarial, and common reforms, as 
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